In one of the worlds whose transformations I follow, an interesting term has emerged in recent months: “coalitions of the willing”. Behind this phrase lies a challenge that many companies and organisations face: a question of mobilisation, deployment and/or agility.
First, let us lift the veil on the context of this phrase: it concerns international relations, military affairs and support for the Ukrainian people in the face of continuing Russian aggression.
Faced with the difficulty of mobilising all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and/or the European Union – particularly because of Donald Trump’s positions – the British and the French proposed, last February, to form a “coalition of the willing” to provide more direct support to Ukraine, and in particular to consider more concretely the deployment of ground troops to enforce a hypothetical ceasefire.
Both organisations have collective defence clauses – those of the European Union being in fact more binding than NATO’s, which leave member countries free to choose the nature of their intervention.
And let us recall in this respect that the European Union is able to intervene directly, drawing on NATO assets under the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangements.
This proposal, which brought together several dozen countries beyond the British and the French, raised questions about implementation (what means, concretely, beyond promises?), but also objections of principle that leaders of civilian companies and organisations know well: if not everyone is going, why allow some to go?
The precedent of the CJTFs
The current crisis has the great merit of making me feel younger… or at least of reminding us that “veterans” can still be of some use.
In the early 1990s, when I was more directly interested in military affairs, I followed with the greatest interest the emergence of CJTFs: Combined Joint Task Forces… Perhaps already a taste for the organisational and human dynamics I have been developing for 25 years now in companies and civilian organisations.
And it is interesting to see that, already at the end of the 1990s, it was the Franco-British partnership, embodied at the time by Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair, that took the initiative…
The idea of CJTFs had, however, been born a few years earlier, within NATO. Probably because, with the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Atlantic Alliance faced the need for new modes of intervention. No longer only being ready for immediate collective defence against a third-party attack on a member country. But also preserving peace and its interests beyond the borders of those member countries.
The idea: to set up “ad hoc” military structures, according to needs, the effects sought, and the political decisions taken in each member country. Whereas, let us remember, the North Atlantic Council operates exclusively by consensus…
We often encounter this question of experimentation, of proofs of concept, of “projects”… in our companies. When we want to “test” a market, develop a product or carry out a specific operation, we create a “project”. An ad hoc team, which relies on a few resources of its own, but above all on allocated human and material resources, on the basis of a “contract” or a gentleman’s agreement.
On the side of the signatory countries, adopting the CJTF principle led organisations to set about establishing CJTF headquarters… Because to conduct a military operation, you need interoperable forces and means (hence the famous STANAGs, for example, but also joint exercises that help people get used to “working better together”). But also a command structure (this term covers not just a “leader”, but above all means of information, coordination and decision – which, for such sensitive matters, cannot be reduced to a single decision-maker).
In the same vein, and with the aim of enabling European initiatives within NATO (the famous “European pillar”), the concept of the “framework nation” was also born – a “political” extension of the CJTF idea, since the Alliance is also (and above all?) a political structure.
This idea seems to have come from Germany, in 2013, before being adopted by NATO in 2014 (the Framework Nations Concept), but the British and the Italians have also developed their own interpretations of this principle, because of different organisations and stakes.
On the French side, it seems to be referred to mainly, implicitly or explicitly (though humility is growing noticeably in attitudes and wording, which can only be welcomed), to explain who is “in charge” of a given operation – the general idea being to allow “small countries” to contribute to operations organised by the few European countries with the military capacity to organise and conduct a multinational operation.
And the Union of concentric circles
In the more “civilian” areas of European cooperation, the same question of the necessary agility of organisations whose membership is growing fast arose in those same years.
The European Union faced the same dilemma: should all rights and obligations be harmonised for all members, or can circles moving at different speeds be accepted?
Far from being a novelty born of the integration of new member countries, this principle of so-called “differentiated integration” had been foreseen by Europe’s founding fathers. The Treaty of Rome thus provides for the possibility of special regimes. And with the introduction of the single currency (the euro) and the free movement agreements (Schengen), we can see a few national exceptions within the European Union.
Unlike NATO structures, which provide for ad hoc perimeters, the European Union has rather spoken of “concentric circles”. With a highly integrated “hard core”, and then the others, which sign up to all or part of the common agreements. Hence the term “concentric circles”.
Moreover, entering these “circles” is meant to last (even if it is always possible to withdraw, as we saw with Brexit). Whereas CJTFs follow the “project” logic we are familiar with: when the military or peacekeeping operation achieves its objective, or reaches its end, the structure is dissolved.
Revisiting the historical context of this idea, I was reminded that Jacques Delors was then one of the promoters of the “concentric circles” idea. And I remembered how virulent the debates were over whether a “multi-speed” Europe was a better idea than deeper integration.
And the fault lines were quite varied:
- Some opposed variable integration – the French Communist Party, notably, in the name of rejecting inequality. And no doubt out of an ideological reflex that prefers uniformity to freedom;
- Others, in the name of a desirable “forced march” towards integration, out of a strong belief in federal structures;
- Others, on the contrary, were in favour, as a way of expressing opposition to European integration while accepting certain arrangements in the name of necessary negotiation;
- And finally the others, more pragmatic, who wanted to deal with issues as they came, test, adjust…
On NATO’s side, it is worth noting that when the CJTF principle was adopted, only Turkey opposed it – requiring an adjustment to reach the consensus needed for the Alliance’s decisions. It feared that the principle of “ad hoc” forces might lead some European countries to support Greece in the long-standing dispute between the two countries.
And now it is Donald Trump’s United States that opposes the emergence of this idea of a “coalition of the willing”, which is in the CJTF tradition, since it would strengthen the European pillar – which is precisely what they demand in the name of “burden sharing”… A sign that “burden sharing” does not imply “leadership sharing”.
Two examples of two organisational traditions and/or practices that are not very receptive to collaborative ways of working…
“Project managers” versus “bureaucrats”
Finally, let us return to our civilian organisations.
To make the link between the entrepreneurs we are in our professional lives and the engaged citizens we may also be on these questions of collective security.
In our companies – and particularly in France – we often observe difficulties with, and opposition to, “project” structures and “matrix” organisations, which aim at the same flexibility, but on a lasting basis.
Because our country’s Jacobin, centralising, monarchical tradition runs through the life of our companies. Even if, fortunately, younger people are now encouraged during their training to practise “project mode” and “collaboration”.
And beyond national or organisational “culture” (a fascinating and multi-faceted subject, contrary to what people imagine, here again, in the purely French context), there is also the “Cartesian” tradition that still shapes our ways of thinking (despite what Jean-François Revel wrote: “Descartes, useless and uncertain”).
This tradition encourages us, to everyone’s great benefit, to identify the problem and find a “rational” solution to it. It is one of the most powerful driving forces of the great engineers who have made our country prosperous, and who are still working to find innovative solutions to the most complex problems.
But when we have to work with other skills, other approaches, other “sensibilities”, we enter a complex situation. Because we often want to be “right” against others… But when it comes to implementation, can anyone be “right” on their own? And is it not better to adopt a “less ideal” solution that will actually be implemented? Whereas the ideal will stay in the drawer?
Fortunately, here again, engineering schools now include modules shared with other programmes (as has long been the case in other countries), and some companies pay close attention to the diversity of approaches.
To put it simply, in political-military organisations as in companies, the “paradigmatic” opposition is between “bureaucrats” and “project managers”.
The former favour control; the latter, freedom.
The former foster uniformity and consistency; the latter, diversity.
The former can lead to heaviness or even paralysis; the latter play on adaptability and agility.
There is no ideal model, and it is always necessary to adopt an organisation suited to the challenges of the moment and to the means available. An organisation which, as a result, can evolve as circumstances change.
What is dangerous is making “ideological” choices. Because the ideal does not exist. Except in our heads and our hearts – and while it is a powerful driving force, we know it is unattainable.
Shall we talk about it?
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