In two of my areas of interest – the life of companies, organisations and their teams, and questions of international relations and defence – but with the same eye, I observe different ways of implementing the decisions taken once the diagnosis has been made.
I recommend and support some of them. I advise against and avoid others.
One might, first of all, take offence at the parallel drawn between the two worlds… After all, successes and mistakes in one are measured in financial profits, and also in jobs (which can be vital, let us not overlook it); in the other, in fortunate or unfortunate consequences for millions of people, sometimes affecting their very existence, and that of their nations.
Yet in both, women and men are at the helm, and their “rationality” is not the only dimension of their decision-making. Even if, at a round table devoted to these subjects at the last Cité de la Réussite, a French annual forum of debates, one of the speakers, hearing others talk about the “geopolitics of emotions” and similar dimensions, expressed surprise at hearing remarks that belonged to “personal development” – with all the judgement that such a “serious” expert could pack into those words…
And when one observes many supporters and practitioners of “chin-jutting diplomacy”, it is fairly easy to guess that, in “managing their stakeholders”, they are just as directive… One is entitled to appreciate this “style”… But there are many other ways of doing things – and for many reasons other than any “weakness of character” – which are, in my experience, far more effective.
A second preliminary point concerns the title of this article, and the argument developed here. Because “knowing” is not “deciding”, and some might consider that a step is missing here, between “knowing” and “implementing”… Well, this objection will be answered further on, because it is possible to consider that certain parameters of decision-making can incorporate, in addition to the elements of the initial “knowledge”, other factors that take into account how the decision will be implemented.
Or why not systematically separate the “what” from the “how”…
Third preliminary point: this is a fairly old subject, found for example in Max Weber’s short work devoted to “The Scholar” and “The Politician” – for these are indeed two separate texts, even if the book is presented under the title The Vocation Lectures, or in French Le savant et le politique… the link being made, at least in the old edition in my library[1], by a masterly introduction by Raymond Aron, from which I draw this illuminating phrase: “the one prefers the uncompromising affirmation of his convictions to success, and the other sacrifices his convictions to the necessities of success”.
So, are you more of a “scholar”, or more of a “politician”? In business, or in international relations?
Imposition: when “decision-makers” also want to be the “ones who know”
This is the approach attributed to the “strong man” (including when he is a woman). Taking a decision on the basis of the elements gathered through an upbringing, an education and convictions that shape the capacity for reasoning and skills, and through knowledge of the relevant “files”.
“Files” also fed by advisers, staff, experts… who are expected to be impartial “scholars”.
“Imposition” is then meant to reflect soundness of judgement, dazzling or considered intelligence, even courage. Because, as the saying goes, “the leader is always alone”… (even if that saying can be disputed).
In many cases, and because society expects it, the most directive have to yield, more or less willingly, with more or less sincerity and effectiveness, to the “fashion” of “communication”, to carry messages and “package” the decision. If need be, they also buy the “social peace” that will accompany their decision with individual or collective compensation, immediate or deferred.
In companies, these imposed decisions are often also accompanied by training. As much as possible or necessary, in “single-loop” iterations: until the technical skills have been acquired – and starting again if necessary…
Since the possible failure to implement the decision – which is necessarily the right one – can only come from the people concerned not having understood it properly. And not from the difficulties encountered coming from other factors[2].
In companies, this is what is called “management by terror”… A terror sometimes wrapped in a coaxing smile or in a paternalism (or maternalism) hungry for control, but which relies on the same levers – and ultimately produces the same effects.
In multilateral contexts, such as multinational alliances, it is not enough to “train” one’s counterparts in the expected ways of working, and this authoritarian “managerial” approach is also practised. This is so-called “chin-jutting diplomacy” (people used to speak of “gunboat diplomacy”)… But you still need, in addition to the chin, a “big stick” (or a “big gun”).
This is what very recent events illustrate, to the great delight of its supporters, in business as on the international stage, through aggressive, so-called “virile” practices. Which seem to produce some impressive results – at first sight, at least.
But those who rejoice forget that aggressive action against a third party may, naturally, also be applied to them. And that while antagonism can pay off in the short term, it is always paid for by the breaking of deep ties, which will inevitably be missed in the longer term.
Because imposition can bring about, when one has the power, obedience or even submission.
And this is no doubt what this type of decision-maker seeks: they prefer “courtiers” to “partisans”.
But the corollary of this kind of behaviour is always a loss of responsibility. Followers will follow… until another stick becomes more threatening.
And in any case they will only do the bare minimum… the minimum that gives them access to the rewards, no more.
As for trust, which guarantees the other’s commitment, including in critical circumstances, and therefore in emergencies, it will be broken. Or it will take a great deal of work, and time, to restore a balanced situation.
To use Max Weber’s typology, this type of “leader” (with all the reservations about quality that the term implies) seeks to acquire both the authority of the “politician” and that of the “scholar”.
Because for him (or her), “power” is not to be shared. His or her “power” is that of domination (“power over”, in Max Weber’s terms), not that of collective action (“power in common”, in Hannah Arendt’s terms).
His master’s voice
A variant, more manipulative or less “courageous” (but does it really take courage to refuse contradiction?), is the use of obedient “expertise”… In this case, the “politician” buys the authority of the “scholars”. A variant, then, of the previous approach since, here again, the aim is to acquire both levers of Weberian authority.
I recently heard someone claim that companies often pay consultants to carry decisions and messages already adopted by management. And that in doing so they were “buying” – the very fact of paying being supposed to show their goodwill – recourse to an authority they did not have… or not entirely.
After 25 years in consulting, I can testify to it. Yes, some clients try… including by “twisting” the findings and recommendations an outside party can give them, and trying to have them carried by the consultant, who is placed in a terrible double bind – required to deliver statements with which he does not agree at all…
In the field of international relations, where the stakes – including financial ones – can be far greater than in companies, one cannot honestly rule out the hypothesis that some “experts”, without falling into “active disinformation”, may agree, out of conviction or self-interest, to present certain forms of “reality”.
But can “scientific knowledge” be bought? Epistemology is a fascinating field… and the question of the relativism of science a fundamental subject[3]. Because the answer may be open to debate.
The point here is not to side with the “scholars” against the politicians. But, as we will see in the other categories, to be able to combine the strengths and constraints of both. Including by taking a decision contrary to “the state of science”, in the name of political constraints. But owning it, not disguising it.
Of course, you will say, “one has to eat”… and “after all, it’s his problem”… But one also has to be able to look at oneself in the mirror… To give up believing one can help them. And, like the terrorised employee, to position oneself as an auxiliary who gives strictly what the employment contract requires. No more.
In any case, this is indeed a variant of the previous type of “decision-maker”: the compulsive micro-manager, or the authoritarian “leader” (with the full weight of the inverted commas)…
Who prefers “mercenaries” to “partners”. Mercenaries who may, depending on the pay offered or the benefits promised, change allegiance…
Looking for culprits: so easy
In both previous cases, we are also often dealing with “decision-makers” and organisations subject to objectives of means rather than objectives of results.
Because, in their view, it will often be easy, in complex situations, to find “reasons” for failure, and always possible to find “culprits” – which will allow the “decision-maker” to try to emerge unscathed from “what didn’t work”.
As often in these reflections, I recommend a detour through the safety sciences, and in particular those which, since the 1980s, have been working to show that designating the “human factor” as the culprit, always the culprit, is not only dishonest but above all counter-productive. And that, on the contrary, it is by breaking free of this unfortunate reflex that organisations increase the safety of their installations, their stakeholders and their practices.
Finally, in these cases of systematic recourse to imposition (because in certain cases of absolute emergency, and as briefly as possible, it can be justified as the only effective option), backed if need be by an accommodating “science”, the authoritarian “leader” rarely questions himself.
And the search for “culprits”, implicit or explicit, is always made easier by the fact that many stakeholders are likely to be singled out… Those concerned who “didn’t understand”, “hidden agendas” (or even “conspiracies”), and of course the “scholars”, who are swiftly disposed of… Because auxiliaries and mercenaries are easily regarded as “consumables”… And indeed, this is the best way to ensure that they do not, after the event, change “master”.
So, without questioning themselves, how will these “leaders” be able to change, and adapt to the difficulties of tomorrow?
The authoritarian leader is therefore, ultimately, ineffective…
At the other end of the spectrum of implementation approaches, there are two radically different ones.
Co-construction: another view of others
“Co-construction” is an approach that has become popular in recent years. “Co-constructing” means fostering the ownership of the final result by the stakeholders involved.
But the name and the practice have, naturally, been overused and distorted. Deliberately or not, because what should be co-constructed, from when, and how far? The answer is not obvious.
Do we co-construct the implementation, the decision, or even the elements of “scientific” knowledge? Where do decision and implementation begin, and where do they end?
What is certain is that the choice of “co-construction” is fundamentally based on a view of others radically different from the views that lead to the practices of imposition: is the other only meant to “do” (with an implicit reference to a division of labour and a hierarchy between “those who know” and “those who do”)?
Or does the other have useful skills that can inform and enrich the decision? Are they an executor or a partner?
And to answer the question “co-construct, but with whom?”, one can usefully draw on existing organisations.
For the decision, and contrary to what is often claimed, the “leader” is never alone. At least not if he or she does not wish to be. At the moment of taking it, depending on the circumstances, he or she may have to decide alone. But throughout the thinking that precedes the decision – except in a life-or-death emergency – he or she will have been able to draw on other skills, other opinions – notably the leadership team – to “co-construct” the decision.
And to involve other actors in “co-constructing” its implementation.
And co-construction is also – above all? – the sign of an assumed humility in the face of the complexity of situations, even in the face of the “fog of war”.
Military command is often held up as an example by supporters of imposition – who in fact have only a caricatured knowledge of it and/or use it as an argument from authority that never stands up to the facts for long.
Because while orders are not to be challenged (and even then they can be, particularly for ethical and/or legal reasons, if the “leader” has disregarded them), implementation is always the subject of a “co-construction” process[4]. Longer or shorter, of course, depending on the circumstances, but fundamental not only in implementation, but from the moment of decision.
And so, contrary to a linear, even vertical, view running from “knowledge” to “decision” to “implementation”, the military commander draws on the knowledge and skills of subordinates and other “stakeholders” to adopt an iterative approach that will enable the group to better face the “fog of war”, notably by ensuring the greatest possible ownership of the decision.
Because in this field, objectives of means are not enough… the aim is the result.
For this, and not only for the ethical reasons of a possible sacrifice freely consented to, no contribution can be done without.
And this decision-making “loop” is certainly a form of “co-construction”.
Commanding by intent
Contrary to what some imagine (and often for themselves), the leader is never omniscient, nor omnipotent. And it is precisely with hard times in mind that the Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Pierre Schill, recalls the fundamental principle of “management by intent”, or rather “command by intent” – known in NATO as mission command[5] (since the term “management” is not always well received in the military world, despite its actual meaning).
His conviction is that this approach is useful in every world, civilian as well as military: “Everyone is seeking to remove the obstacles, to restore a culture of results and risk-taking, and to ‘unleash energies’ in a national and international context that calls for questioning as much as for action”.
The principle of command by intent is one of those underlying the French Army’s tactical decision-making method (MEDOT): subsidiarity. In the fog of war, the leader can never be sure of being permanently in contact with the operator on the ground. And above all, he cannot judge the whole situation in the operator’s place… The famous “situational awareness” that guarantees the resilience of a socio-technical system, and the effectiveness of situation assessment in a context of high cognitive “intensity”.
It is therefore essential that, all along the chain of command, everyone has fully understood “the commander’s intent”, in order to be able to continue to act, or even adapt their action to the situation, to pursue and reach the “desired end state”. Objectives of results rather than objectives of means…
It is interesting to recall (though only the older among us can) that the temptation for the top of the pyramid to control the operator on the ground – reinforced by the growing technologisation of our societies, which can give some the feeling of “total knowledge” and therefore (wrongly) of “omnipotence” – had emerged with the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) in the 1990s, particularly in the United States. And we remember the hunt for Bin Laden followed live in the White House situation room by the American President and his team… (even if watching is not necessarily commanding).
But in France, perhaps for lack of similar technological means, or perhaps out of deep-seated philosophy, this principle of subsidiarity had been preserved…
Managing by intent
“Command by intent” can be transposed to the civilian world. This was in fact the subject of the first “Rencontres du Commandement” (Command Meetings), organised on 30 January at the École Militaire in Paris by the Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Pierre Schill[6].
On that occasion, Cécile Beliot-Zind, head of the Bel Group, described the company as “a set of conversations”. Individual conversations, collective conversations… without a doubt, and that is what I shared in a short article here: “Two-ways conversations”[7]. Conversations as levers of change and as a mobilisation technique, including in very difficult situations.
And conversation is one of the means of co-construction, because everyone brings their ideas and proposals to it, genuinely listening to the other and taking them into account as far as possible. Because, as the speaker put it, “you have to show them that what they say counts”.
In companies, of course, it is not “command” but “management”.
If only because, given the desired balance of power and organisations designed to respond to the socio-technical complexity of multi-business, multi-regional or even multinational companies, one is never everyone’s “boss”, but rather the pivot of a set of stakeholders.
A situation that leads to so-called “matrix” organisations, which General Schill in fact quickly dismissed at the opening of the session… And yet, are matrix organisations really so unsuited to the military world? If you are so inclined, you can also read here the long piece I devoted to the subject a few months ago[8].
Co-construction is therefore both an intention and a way of looking at others. But it is also a process and a set of practices. It cannot be improvised. It is learnt, and practised.
And it is also organised, because organisations should formalise the way things actually work. Whereas they are often designed according to other criteria, and “real” ways of working inevitably emerge that bypass them. Allowing the overall system to function, but at the cost of unnecessary effort and risk-taking.
The ideal organisation does not exist. But there are resonances between organisations and management styles. More mechanistic for more directive functioning; more homogeneous when the focus is on cohesion; more competitive when priority is given to creativity and innovation; and “holomorphic”, to give everyone the space they need for both demanding standards and benevolence…
So, to return to Weber’s typology, the choice of co-construction is neither that of the scholar nor that of the politician. But rather an alliance of the two.
And that is why, rather than the Weberian vision of power “over others”, supporters and practitioners of “co-construction” draw more on Hannah Arendt’s conception of “power”: the power to act with others, for others…
In the international field, since that was the other area to which this article applies, this is normally how alliances work. Starting, in the current context, with the Atlantic Alliance…
Even if, as Olivier Schmitt said in a very recent episode of the French podcast “Le Collimateur”, this may be changing, with the Alliance being transformed in nature into a “pact of domination” (he draws the analogy with the Warsaw Pact, but the idea is there)[9].
Lateralisation, a variant for difficult projects
And finally… Just as imposition has its variant, “his master’s voice”, co-construction also has a variant: “lateralisation”.
Because, in our world that likes to see itself as “benevolent”, co-construction – whatever term is used – is put forward by many leaders keen to highlight their ability to listen and/or to take everyone’s talents into account.
This is often sincere, beyond those who use “his master’s voice”.
In many projects, co-construction is more than a communication lever: it accelerates ownership, and therefore performance, when it comes to moving from decision to implementation.
But sometimes the collaborative practice wanted by leaders does not “trickle down” throughout the organisation.
For many reasons. Because some local decision-makers prefer to keep a more authoritarian practice. But also, quite simply, because the devil is always in the details… Very practical “details” that escape the upper layers of the organisation but which the middle management layers have to deal with.
Between intention and action, there is reality…
That is why, when leaders state in good faith that they have decided on a very participative (or co-constructive) implementation, it is important to go and see things as close as possible to where the work is done. Where other levels of “conversation” come into play.
And in some cases, co-constructed though it may be, a sensitive project fails in its implementation. Because this “co-construction” must apply not only to implementation, but also to the content of the decision. By genuinely involving the scholars, the politicians and the users. Because the initial decision, even if “ideal”, is impossible to implement.
So is it better to have an ideal project left in a drawer, after many additional costs and delays, or a “lateralised” project that succeeds?
This “lateral project strategy” was formalised by the late Olivier d’Herbemont and Bruno César, both of whom died far too young. Their book was published in 1996 and accompanied my first steps in consulting on transforming organisations by mobilising stakeholders. Long out of print, it was republished in January 2023[10].
So read it and/or let’s talk about it!
[1] Max Weber, « Le savant et le politique », Librairie Plon, 1959
[2] See the work of Argyris and Schön on “single-loop” and “double-loop” learning. The latter suggests, when the “single loop” is not enough, questioning other “levers” (convictions, values…).
[3] On this subject, I recommend reading the essential « Le relativisme est-il résistible ? » by Raymond Boudon and Maurice Clavelin, PUF, 1994
[4] I cannot recommend highly enough taking part in the MEDOT workshops (the French Army’s method for tactical operational decision-making), which the Army now runs for increasingly diverse audiences.
[5] « Armées : pour gagner, risquer l’initiative » (Armed forces: to win, risk taking the initiative), Pierre Schill, Les Echos, 28 January 2025
[6] These meetings can be watched again at: https://www.youtube.com/live/pxVbdcjfyWc
[7] “Two-ways conversations”, October 2020 https://www.kaqi.fr/en/two-way-conversations/
[8] « Les matrices, des organisations inaptes au combat ? » (Matrix organisations: unfit for combat?), March 2024, in French https://www.kaqi.fr/les-matrices-des-organisations-inaptes-au-combat/
[9] « Trump, la folie et le rapport de force » https://lerubicon.org/collimateur-04-02-25/
[10] Olivier d’Herbemont, Bruno César, « La stratégie du projet latéral », Dunod, 2023.
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