Sociodynamics is both an interpretive framework and an art of setting actors and organisations in motion. Closer to the philosophy of the game of go than to that of chess, it recommends in particular increasing one’s degrees of freedom and fostering synergies, rather than exhausting oneself by always playing in the same register, directive and authoritarian.
In this respect, Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ukraine and the Ukrainian armed forces are demonstrating, in the face of Vladimir Putin’s aggression, a remarkably sociodynamic approach, favouring collective dynamics over autocratic power.
One more reason, among a thousand others, to support the Ukrainian people against Russia’s multidimensional offensives.
Let us start with a few fundamentals of sociodynamics.
When it comes to managing relations between individuals, sociodynamics offers a reading that goes beyond the linear and reductive opposition between “for” and “against” – “you are either with me or against me”.
And rather than categorising people, it takes into account, at a given moment, their actions in relation to a project, a shared objective. Because in sociodynamics, we do not assess people, we take their actions into account. And we do so along two orthogonal axes: synergy (the energy devoted to the project) and antagonism (the energy spent to the detriment of the project, or in favour of another one – because time and energy are limited resources).
This gives an assessment along these two dimensions – and a large proportion of actors are often in a “yes, if” or “no, but” position: the “hesitant”, who show as much synergy as antagonism. And the “passive”, who do not commit. There are also “supporters”, unfailing pillars; “opponents”, even “irreducibles”, who deploy their energy against the project; the “torn”, the “grumblers”… And then the “golden triangles”: supporters who show synergistic initiative but also a welcome critical spirit.
The result is a “partner map”: the playing field, and the field of stakes, of the stakeholders.
Adapting one’s relational mode
To manage the relationship with all these stakeholders, sociodynamics recommends adapting one’s “management” to their attitudes and actions (because “managing” means bringing the relationship to life).
Rather than trying in vain to convince “opponents” (because they have a different project from yours), the idea is to adopt a “directive” management style with them: stick to the law, the regulations, the employment contract, and enforce them. And above all, do not devote all one’s energy and time to them, but at most a small part (a third, or even less).
Because, contrary to what is often done, the main challenge is rather to mobilise one’s “allies” (supporters and golden triangles) so that they strengthen your project with their initiatives, convince the “hesitant”, who are ready to “tip over”, and mobilise the “passive”, who often represent the great mass of stakeholders. It is therefore necessary to implement, with them and for them, participative management, which is enriched by their synergies and makes them fully actors in the shared project.
And with the “hesitant” and the “passive”, one can practise “transactional” management, based on negotiation and win-win play.
In short, and at the managerial level, sociodynamics recommends the joint use of participative and transactional practices – directive management being reserved for containing opponents or, for a very short period and at the cost of lasting fractures in trust, commitment and therefore relationships, for handling emergencies (a crisis not being, in the long run, an emergency).
Finally, sociodynamics describes four types of organisation, according to their propensity to encourage, on the one hand, a sense of belonging (“ego”) and, on the other, openness to the world and innovation (“eco”).
There are thus “mechanistic” organisations, which refer above all to regulations and procedures, operate by injunction (no sense of belonging) and discourage initiative (no openness).
“Tribal” organisations, for their part, favour insularity, solidarity and closure. They provide comfort but, lacking openness, lack creativity.
More outward-looking, “individualistic” organisations stimulate competition, innovation, contracts and “mercenary” relationships… They are agile but fragile, because of weak social cohesion.
And then there are “ideal” organisations (the ideal always being hard to achieve and maintain), which reconcile openness to the world and cohesion: “holomorphic” organisations – in which, as with fractals, the qualities of the whole are found at the smallest organisational level.
A sociodynamics of armed conflict?
Sociodynamics is an art of relationships, between individuals and between organisations. Is it therefore an approach suited to analysing armed conflicts, whose objective, one might think a priori, is the destruction of the other – which is a very particular form of “relationship”…?
The abundance of media commentary in recent months has probably made a wide public aware of the many dimensions of a war, beyond the mere clash of arms, which is why these lines will nevertheless apply the sociodynamic lens to some of them.
Let us begin with the manoeuvre of arms, with “kinetic” conflict, which calls for very particular technical and human expertise.
Unless one is a very well-informed expert, it is impossible to make a precise assessment of the sociodynamics of military operations. Nevertheless, a few facts bear witness to the dynamics driven by the Ukrainian forces and, conversely, to the practices of the Russian invasion army.
As early as 2014, Ukraine undertook a complete overhaul of its strategic thinking[1]. It adopted a decentralised organisation suited to “network-centric” warfare, based on a high degree of autonomy for units, down to the infantry section, close combined-arms cooperation and the engagement of the population in civil disobedience and hybrid warfare actions. Characteristic ingredients of collective dynamics, of synergies.
In contrast, Russian doctrine calls for shock and awe: massive strikes followed by a deep breakthrough. Escalation of violence, or “more of the same”, in a single direction.
During the Russian offensive of February 2022, these two doctrines clashed. The invasion forces failed in their attempted “decapitation” and in the expected moral collapse of Ukraine. Ukrainian strategy, for its part, is described along three lines[2], which owe more to go than to chess, and to the principles of sociodynamics:
- mobilising the international community (calling on allies, outside the existing “board”);
- the resistance of the nation and the maintenance of its will to fight (strengthening collective belonging – the “ego” dimension – which is indispensable in difficult times);
- the success of the operational defence by safeguarding the main cities (multiplying “territories” on the “game board”, points of support, and decentralising action).
The Ukrainian forces have also implemented remarkable innovations.
And while we now talk about the routine use of drones – a term covering a whole range from small observation devices to piloted machines capable of bombing – it is worth remembering that the first ones were used by Ukrainians, starting from consumer devices (like those the French company Parrot had launched in 2010, before refocusing on professional uses), operated not by professional soldiers but by civilian volunteers, taken as close to the front as possible by specialised operators. To provide reconnaissance for the troops, before being adapted as “bomb droppers” – another creation…
Likewise, right from the start of the invasion, there were reports of a “social network” fed by Ukrainian volunteers to inform the armed forces in real time of the location of enemy troops.
And let us not forget the provision of Starlink communication systems by the ever-surprising Elon Musk…
These three examples of innovation illustrate the synergies that the art of sociodynamics recommends: calling for volunteers, encouraging initiatives, nurturing joint achievements, and taking one’s allies “as they are”, provided their contributions are useful to the shared project.
Because while some believe that their “allies” must absolutely match a fixed profile (often a rare bird that does not exist), sociodynamicists look above all for the benefits of synergies. Deviations from an “ideal” matter little when the contribution is strong, because what matters most is the actual contribution to the collective project. As for critical thinking, it is not dismissed but, on the contrary, encouraged, provided it comes with strong synergies. Because these doubts, questions or even challenges are then aimed at improving the effectiveness of the shared dynamic.
Synergies rather than imposition
And these synergies between soldiers and committed civilians are, as Michel Goya recalled in his book « S’adapter pour vaincre » (Adapt to win)[3], a key to military innovation. Whereas purely “normative” approaches, which seek to bring skills and resources under control, kill innovation by inevitably handing it over to the failings of bureaucracy.
The use of “proxies” (associated forces) is another possible application of the sociodynamics of conflict, since it involves studying, as Olivier Zajec explains[4], the nature of relationships: those between “principals” and their “agents”.
Two scenarios are proposed. Exploitation, in which the “exploited” agent depends entirely on its sponsor. And transaction, in which the proxy does not give up its own objective – with all the uncertainty about possible deviations…
This framework can then be applied to the troops supporting the Russian army, and to all those who have committed themselves alongside the Ukrainians to a common objective: ending the invasion (because, in conflict, one must always keep in mind the question of the “desired end state”).
At the start of the Russian invasion, many “volunteer groups”, local or foreign, were seen joining the armed conflict alongside the Ukrainian army. They were gradually integrated into the official order of battle – no doubt for reasons of necessary coordination of effort and support, but also with an at least implicit message of national cohesion: the “ego” dimension added to the “eco” dimension of “individualistic” (or “mercenary”) organisations.
Whereas, on the Russian side, the game is still one of using auxiliaries and mercenaries driven by their own objectives – a typical way of operating for “mechanistic” organisations, based on authority and execution, with no concern for a sense of belonging and cohesion.
In one case, bringing a fighting dynamic to life, accepting certain “antagonisms” as long as the synergies shown are stronger, and aiming above all to achieve the common objective by mobilising as many people as possible.
In the other, authoritarian or even autocratic “governance”, which never guarantees the durability of “domination”. And which inevitably demotivates the “dominated” while encouraging competing projects.
A sociodynamics of cognitive warfare
It is talked about more and more: war is not only a matter of armed clashes, but also a conflict of perceptions. Those of soldiers, of their military and civilian leaders, and of the populations that support them directly, or indirectly through their influence on state leaders.
Here again, the Ukrainians are demonstrating practices worthy of the best sociodynamic expertise.
While Vladimir Putin activates his opinion relays – whether official or motivated by the classic “MICE” (money, ideology, compromise, ego) – Ukraine relies on its “allies”: volunteers who commit themselves to the battle for minds in support of the shared project – ending the Russian invasion.
And here again, the methods and the nature of the actors show the great differences between the vertical approach and the sociodynamics of stakeholders.
On the Russian side, there is a reliance on a “narrative” and on “official” media relays, or on actors claiming “legitimacy” in the name of a supposedly glorious past or of expertise that is often self-proclaimed.
Among those supporting Ukrainian freedoms, one sees a bit of everything.
Unprecedented coverage of military operations, thanks to new means of capture and broadcasting. Media coverage of the monstrous practices of the occupying troops against the Ukrainian population and defenders, which will, one hopes, feed and accelerate criminal prosecutions.
But also a plurality of highly offbeat communication actions, such as the many “memes” and video testimonies that flood social networks and, in turn, traditional media, and show a humour, a critical spirit and even a poetry reminiscent of the samizdat of the Soviet era: humour and poetry, eternal resources of a humanity resisting totalitarianism.
On one side, a message is imposed and channels are manipulated. On the other, initiatives emerge that are sometimes clumsy but often skilful – in our digital world, the best are quickly identified and shared. And all driven by the same goodwill, in support of a shared objective – even if it is not formulated.
On one side, uniformity and authority. On the other, profusion and free will.
Emergence or conspiracy?
In the face of this profusion, denouncing a “conspiracy” or a “Great Satan” has become a familiar figure. Because in the authoritarian world, which works only through injunctions and the following of a “providential man”, the logics of collective mobilisation, autonomy and emergence are not understood. Nor is spontaneous support for an obvious and shared cause.
And this is a radical, almost ontological front line: unity against multitude, the pillar against the network. Totalitarianism against democratic plurality. The plurality that supporters of authoritarian ways of operating reject in the name of supposed “efficiency”.
Here again, and because cognitive warfare is gaining importance in state strategies, the proxy framework is also fruitful.
On one side, a central power and its dependants. On the other, a profusion that multiplies modes and fields of action. The challenges of control on one side, those of coordination on the other. “Power over” on one side, “power with” on the other. On one side Max Weber and bureaucracy, on the other Hannah Arendt and human relations.
Bringing collective dynamics to life – which begins with accepting and encouraging them – is a key skill conferred by the principles formalised in sociodynamics. And in this case, the advantage clearly lies with the Ukrainians and their supporters.
This also allows them to multiply the “boards” and to change them as the context and events evolve, or to play across the different territories of the go board, rather than letting themselves be locked into a single front line. Keeping “degrees of freedom”: a strong principle shared by sociodynamics and the game of go…
A sociodynamics of domestic and international politics
Finally, and because war is also waged on the political level, practices on the domestic front and on the international stage can be analysed in the light of the keys of sociodynamics.
International mobilisation was rapid, and “individual” initiatives were more numerous than institutional dynamics, particularly in the countries that had known the Soviet yoke and Soviet crimes.
The Baltic and Nordic countries, and the countries that had regained their freedom after the collapse of the Soviet empire, immediately showed their synergies. Politically and materially. Without hesitation. True allies.
And they did so by overcoming old historical or territorial quarrels, the former “empires”.
Then the institutional alliances got moving… NATO, the European Union, the United Nations…
But in this multipolar world, vertical, arrogant or even authoritarian approaches are ineffective… Chest-thumping matters little; only actions count, real synergies. Clearly opposing the enemy – including by paying, in one’s own comfort, the price of this attachment to shared principles – supporting refugees, providing resources, or taking the train to make an impression and thus mobilise those who are hesitating…
With this conflict, the world is finding a new balance. Between ageing and often infantilising approaches, which still believe in the power of a sometimes self-conferred “status”. And those that choose action, the choice of synergies.
The dynamics of Ukrainian society are documented in Alexandra Goujon’s book, updated in early 2023[5]; she also contributed to a remarkable episode of « Le Collimateur », the podcast of IRSEM (the French Ministry of the Armed Forces’ strategic research institute)[6], on 22 February 2023.
As she describes, Ukraine did not mobilise solely around a central power, but with a wide plurality of actors.
Admittedly, Volodymyr Zelensky’s courage and skill reassured both the Ukrainian people and their allies, and made it possible to organise the defence of the territory around the Ukrainian armed forces. But what guaranteed the continuity of services to the population and the development of support actions was indeed the emergence of multiple initiatives, only partly coordinated by State services, which were naturally overwhelmed by the scale of such a crisis. Because when trust is shared in the service of a common objective, what need is there for “control”, which is inevitably ineffective?
And since the “Maidan Revolution” of late 2013, the Ukrainian people have demonstrated remarkable capacities for self-organisation. First to revolt against the violence of the pro-Russian government (95 deaths among the demonstrators – the “Heavenly Hundred” – and 19 among the police[7]), and then to resist the first Russian offensives.
Ukrainian society: rebellious or sociodynamic?
As Alexandra Goujon points out, the revolt of winter 2013–2014 certainly brought together opposition parties, but above all ordinary citizens who set up intervention and support services (patrols, blocking police buses, transporting wood, fuel and food) and care services that some described – for lack of any other framework of understanding – as a “State within the State”, or even as the product of foreign intervention, whereas humanitarian NGOs were only some of the actors in this profusion of synergistic initiatives.
And Ukrainians would again demonstrate this capacity for mobilisation and self-organisation at the time of the annexation of Crimea, and then during the invasion of February 2022: with purely military mobilisation, within the armed forces or in initially autonomous groups, but also with fundraising, humanitarian action, volunteering to load and unload goods or weave camouflage nets. And also by providing professional psychological support, or continuing to teach refugee pupils…
As Alexandra Goujon puts it: “civil society is often considered in terms of its opposition to the State. It is made up of individuals or groups whose actions are certainly not controlled by the public authorities, but which lead them to have relations with them (…) a State within the State: this metaphor assumes that citizens are able to take the place of the State, whereas they act rather in the interstices of public action”.
Preferring “relationships” to “control”: a fine illustration of sociodynamic approaches…
The sociodynamic approach, a vehicle for regained freedoms
In running a business, the sociodynamic approach proves its usefulness and power in many contexts, particularly when tensions and conflicts have to be faced. Because one cannot “kill” the other – at least not in our democratic societies. So one has to “make do with” them, as far as possible.
In a regulated political debate, at national or international level, the rules are the same. And here again, synergies must be multiplied in order to carry the decision.
In the warlike extension of political confrontation, sociodynamics is probably also useful – if only because war is not only a war of arms. And this power serves those who, like the Ukrainians, prefer freedom to totalitarianism, and choose synergies rather than crushing the other.
So, in our daily lives as in every context of our lives, let us show through our actions and commitments that Ukraine’s camp is clearly ours: the camp of freedom, initiative and autonomy.
[1] Thibault Fouillet, « Guerre en Ukraine : étude opérationnelle d’un conflit de haute intensité (premier volet) » (War in Ukraine: an operational study of a high-intensity conflict, part one), Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, February 2023
[2] Ibid.
[3] Michel Goya, « S’adapter pour vaincre », Perrin, 2019
[4] Olivier Zajec, « Stratégie et guerres par proxies » (Strategy and proxy wars), Défense & Sécurité Internationale no. 163, January–February 2023.
[5] Alexandra Goujon, « L’Ukraine, de l’indépendance à la guerre » (Ukraine, from independence to war), Le Cavalier Bleu, 2023
[6] « Le front ukrainien, un an après » (The Ukrainian front, one year on), Le Collimateur, IRSEM podcast, 22 February 2023 (in French), available on podcast platforms
[7] Alexandra Goujon, op. cit.
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